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Abstract: We examine the firm performance implications of managers having an incorrect
representation of their inter-firm task interdependencies in the context of alliance relationships.
Although uncertainty regarding inter-firm interdependence is common in practice when
structuring alliances, prior literature provides limited evidence on the firm performance
implications of such “misspecifications.” We employ a computational model to examine firm
performance in an alliance context where firms have either under- or over-specified views of
their inter-firm interdependencies. We find that firm performance declines with greater
misspecification, with variation in this effect across alliance governance modes and across levels
of actual interdependence. In addition, we find that interdependence misspecifications have
differing effects on exploration and coordination, leading to tradeoffs between performance and
these other non-performance alliance objectives.
Keywords: Strategic alliances; interdependence; coordination; exploration; NK-model

1

INTRODUCTION
The strategic alliance literature points to inter-firm task interdependencies as a key link between
alliance governance choice and firm performance (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Aggarwal, Siggelkow
and Singh, 2011; Reuer and Devarakonda, 2015). Alliances involve the need to coordinate
interdependencies across organizational boundaries (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989; Ring and
Van de Ven, 1992), as well as the need to select governance mechanisms for inter-firm decision
making (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Reuer and Devarakonda, 2015). The nature of inter-firm
interdependence has been shown to influence governance mode choice (Kale and Puranam,
2004; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005) as well as the performance implications of this choice
(Sampson, 2004; Mayer and Teece, 2008).
Prescriptive managerial advice stemming from this stream of the extant alliance literature
generally makes the implicit assumption that in the course of deciding on a mode of governance,
allying firms are “correct” in their representations of inter-firm interdependencies. In practice,
however, managers often enter into alliances with an imperfect ex ante understanding of their
true patterns of inter-firm interdependence (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Doz, 1996). This
makes selection of a “correct” structure likely to be an unrealistic assumption. Our aim in this
paper is thus to better understand the implications of relaxing the assumption that managers
correctly understand inter-firm interdependencies when selecting an alliance governance mode.
We focus on two forms of such interdependence misspecifications—over-specification and
under-specification—analyzing how these incorrect managerial representations of inter-firm task
interdependencies influence firm performance in an alliance setting, under varying
interdependence and governance mode conditions.
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A small set of studies lends credence to the notion that managers do not have a fully
correct understanding of their inter-firm task interdependencies when entering into alliances
(Doz, 1996; Sosa, Eppinger and Rowles, 2004; Gokpinar, Hopp and Iravani, 2010). Although
these studies have made important strides in expanding our understanding of the role of
interdependence misspecifications, relatively little large-sample empirical research has addressed
this issue (many of these studies are single case-based). One reason for the lack of research on
this topic is the difficulty in measuring managers’ ex-ante understanding of interdependencies.
We consequently have very little understanding of the relative performance implications of
different forms of interdependence misspecifications. To remedy this gap we develop a
computational model that allows us to simulate managers’ understanding of underlying task
structures under different scenarios. This approach, we believe, offers a first step in pushing the
literature toward a deeper understanding of how interdependence misspecifications influence
firm performance in the context of alternate governance mode choices.
A key benefit of employing a computational model is that such models naturally
overcome the limitation of not being able to observe counterfactuals, a critical constraint in
empirical work. Examining the antecedents of alliance governance choice (e.g., Kogut and
Singh, 1988; Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Dyer, Kale and Singh, 2004; Villalonga and McGahan,
2005), for example, very often relies on observing only realized transactions. A computational
modeling approach allows us to develop insights by creating counterfactuals and specifying
scenarios that are difficult (or impossible) to observe empirically.
We build on a rich body of work that has used computational methods to develop insights
into issues in strategy (e.g. Levinthal, 1997). Such an approach enables us to abstract away from
industry and firm-level factors such as resource complementarity, trust, and prior experience
3

(Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002), and to focus instead on isolating the
performance effects of errors associated with task interdependence structure assessment. In
particular, we model various task interdependence structures and their associated errors, a goal
that would not be possible to accomplish with empirical methods alone.1
Our results lead to several sets of insights. First, we find that interdependence
misspecifications lead to a loss in firm value, with the relative magnitude of this loss varying by
governance mode. Across-mode differences further suggest that normative advice regarding
governance mode selection in alliances should be conditional on the relative level of ex-ante
managerial certainty regarding the nature of inter-firm interdependence. Second, we find that
increases in the actual (correct) level of interdependence reduce the underperformance penalty
associated with interdependence misspecifications. Finally, we find that under- and overspecification influence alliance performance through their effect on the extent of exploration and
the magnitude of coordination failures experienced by the firms in the alliance. While overspecification increases both exploration and coordination failures, under-specification decreases
these two effects. The relative magnitude of the two effects explains the resulting impact on firm
performance. When exploration and coordination itself are outcomes of interest in an alliance
setting, our insights further point to the possibility of a tradeoff between performance and nonperformance outcomes, which may condition alliance governance mode choice.
In the next section we briefly highlight the literature which serves to motivate and frame
our research question. In the subsequent sections we detail our computational model and
associated analyses, with the aim of more deeply understanding the implications of

1

Our study complements recent work examining misspecification of interdependencies in a single firm setting
(Martignoni, Menon and Siggelkow, 2015). This work differs from ours in important ways, with one key difference
being that Martignoni et al. (2015) focus on misspecification in a single-firm setting (versus an inter-firm setting
like ours in which governance mode issues are paramount).
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interdependence misspecifications for firm performance in an alliance setting. We end by
discussing the implications of our study for theory and for future research.

MOTIVATING LITERATURE
Alliances are complex inter-organizational relationships with high failure rates (Kale, Dyer and
Singh, 2002; Kale and Singh, 2009; Lunnan and Haugland, 2008). A key challenge in an alliance
context is governing the joint set of activities of the partnering firms. Recent work on alliance
governance has underscored the importance of coordination among partner firms as a critical
determinant of relationship success (e.g, Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam,
2005; Reuer and Arino, 2007). Coordination is often necessary as partners must engage in joint
tasks without the benefits of the structures and systems available in traditional hierarchies (Gulati
and Singh, 1998). Difficulties arise from decomposing tasks and from ensuring the division of
labor outside organizational boundaries, and coordination challenges persist even with perfect
alignment of self-interest among the interacting parties (Heath and Staudenmayer, 2000;
Kretschmer and Puranam, 2008).
While firms can address coordination challenges through a variety of mechanisms,
including the use of detailed contracts that specify tasks, roles and responsibilities (Mayer and
Argyres, 2004; Carson, Madhok and Wu, 2006; Reuer and Arino, 2007), contingency plans and
responses (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), and information sharing and feedback (Argyres and
Mayer, 2007), explicit governance mechanisms are an over-arching channel through which
coordination challenges are often resolved in alliance settings (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Interfirm interdependencies influence both the nature of the desired alliance governance structure, as
well as the consequent performance of the relationship in the context of such a structure (Gulati
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and Singh, 1998; Mayer and Teece, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Reuer and Devarakonda, 2015;
Kim, Zhao and Anand, 2015).
What are the implications of employing particular alliance governance structures when
interdependencies are not correctly understood by managers? Though the literature on this
question is limited, as the typical assumption is one of perfect knowledge regarding the nature
and extent of task interdependencies (which in turn dictates appropriate governance structure
choice), several studies have used case examples to illustrate the consequences of incorrect ex
ante assessments of such interdependencies (e.g. Doz, 1996; Sosa et al., 2004; Gopkinar et al.,
2010). In a study of the R&D alliance between Ciba Geigy and Alza to develop a drug called
OROS, for example, Doz (1996) finds that the allying firms started with an incorrect
understanding of the nature of interdependencies among their underlying tasks. Their assumption
was that the alliance would involve a simple “handover” of the drug from Alza to Ciba Geigy. In
reality, however, the alliance required a high level of coordination between the downstream
functions of both firms. Over the course of the alliance, as the firms realized the need for tighter
coordination, they then ended up over-specifying the level of interdependence, selecting a
governance structure that provided greater levels of coordination than actually required. As a
consequence of the firms’ interdependence misspecifications (and sub-optimal governance
choices), joint development of the drug was slowed, and the alliance failed to meet its intended
objectives.
Under-specified representations of task interdependencies can likewise be problematic.
Sosa et al. (2004; 2007) address the under-specification issue in their study of a large
commercial aircraft engine project. They find that a significant number of interdependencies
between sub-systems were invisible to system architects. As a consequence, system architects
6

did not set up appropriate structures to deal with underlying interdependencies, with the
misalignment in structure and task interdependence resulting in significant cost and program
delay.
Despite the fact that over- or under-specification of inter-firm task interdependencies is
likely to be common in practice across many types of inter-organizational relationships, there is
little systematic evidence in the literature (with the exception of a small set of case-based
examples, two of which we mention above) as to how interdependence misspecification might
affect the performance of firms, particularly under alternate modes of governing the alliance
relationship itself. Our methodological approach in this paper, therefore, is to employ a
computational model to investigate the link between misspecified levels of interdependence and
alliance performance in a systematic manner. This approach enables us to develop a set of
theoretical insights that might then serve as the basis for future empirical research. We turn to the
details of our computational model in the next section.

MODEL
Tasks and interdependencies
We draw on the NK approach to modeling firm decision making (Kauffman, 1993, Levinthal,
1997), which conceptualizes firms as consisting of a set of inter-related activities, N, that can
represent various organizational decisions such as those related to firm strategy, organizational
form, product design, and so forth (Rivkin, 2000).2 The canonical NK model assumes that these
N activities are interrelated so that a change in one activity affects the payoff to the other K
activities. Firm performance is based on the unique configuration of these N activities, with the

2 We use the term “activities” interchangeably with “choices” and “tasks” throughout this paper.
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topography (“ruggedness”) of the performance landscape determined by the degree of interaction
among the firm’s activities (Levinthal, 1997).
We build on Aggarwal et al. (2011), who extend the canonical NK approach to a twofirm alliance setting. In this model there are two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, each of which makes
decisions over a set of binary activities denoted by

and

. A subset of the activities of each

firm is considered to be part of the alliance relationship (the “alliance activities”), denoted by

,

while the remainder of the activities are outside the scope of the alliance (the “non-alliance
activities”), denoted by

. Firm 1’s activities are thus denoted by

activities are denoted by

. The two-firm system we model consists of a total of 12

activities, each of which is denoted by
allocation of each of the

, with

running from 1 to 12.3 Figure 1 illustrates the

activities to the four activity sets

example, the non-alliance activities are represented by
activities are represented by

while Firm 2’s

. For Firm 1, for
and the alliance

. Interdependencies among particular activities, which

can be either intra-firm or inter-firm, are indicated with an “X”.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
We then consider five different patterns of interdependence, as illustrated in Figure 2,
each of which contains a different set of interdependencies among the four activity sets described
in Figure 1. We select these patterns in order to model the characteristics of a broad range of
interdependence forms. The patterns not only increase in the overall level of interdependence,
but each successive pattern introduces a particular class of interdependence among the activity
sets

(e.g., going from Pattern 1 to Pattern 2 introduces interdependencies within

the alliance activities) so that we can more easily isolate the implications of interdependencies of
3 This value for N is consistent with prior NK literature (e.g., Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007; Aggarwal et al., 2011).
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different types. While these patterns are certainly not exhaustive, they collectively enable us to
conduct a set of analyses that can generate insights into the mechanisms underlying our core
research question around the impact of interdependence misspecifications.
Pattern 1, which we refer to as fully decomposable, has interactions only within each of
the four activity subsets
activities in

: the activities within the

, and the same holds for activities within

subset only affect other
In Pattern 2, pure alliance

interaction, we introduce interactions within each of the sets of alliance activities of both the
firms (i.e., within

and

). In Pattern 3, firm own-alliance interaction, we introduce

interactions within the firm’s own non-alliance and alliance activities so that activities within
interact with activities within

,

and activities within

interact with activities within

.

In

Pattern 4, firm partner-alliance interaction, the alliance activities of one firm interact with the
non-alliance activities of the partner (activities within
activities within

interact with those of

interact with activities within

, and

). And finally, for Pattern 5, full interdependence,

there is complete interdependence, with all activities interacting with one other.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Performance landscapes
Each unique configuration of the N activities in the two-firm system (in which, as discussed
above, the full set of N activities is divided into the subsets

) has associated with

it a particular performance level. To create the performance landscape we follow the standard
approach in the NK literature (e.g. Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin 2000): for each of the N activities,
in the system, we define a contribution value function
(either 0 or 1) of

, together with the state of the

. Each

,

takes as parameters the state

other policies with which

interacts (these

interactions are defined, as described above, by the interaction matrix associated with the
9

particular interdependence pattern being considered), and is initialized with a value drawn at
random from a uniform
and its

distribution for each possible combination of the various states of

interacting policies. The set of N contribution value functions

is defined at the

outset, and remains unchanged as the simulation progresses.
The overall performance of the entire two-firm system for any given configuration of
activities

(i.e., the N-dimensional vector of

particular configuration i.e. ∑

values) is the sum of the N

values for that

. We can define the performance of Firm 1 for a given

as

the sum of the contribution values of the activities specific to the firm itself, plus a portion, , of
the alliance activities (we set
∑

( )

∑

throughout). The performance of Firm 1, for example is

( ). To reduce statistical artifacts we follow the commonly employed

approach in the NK literature in which the reported performance values are normalized by
dividing the raw performance by the performance value at the highest peak in the landscape (see
e.g., Rivkin and Siggelkow [2003]).

Interdependence misspecifications
Modeling misspecifications in managerial representations of task interdependencies requires that
we model not only the true underlying interaction matrix among the firms, but also that we
model the misspecified representation of the interaction matrix that is taken into account by
managers as they make decisions. We do so by modeling two matrices, with the true matrix used
to determine the actual performance that managers observe as a consequence of their choices,
and the misspecified matrix used to determine the choice that managers actually make as they
search the landscape.
More formally, we define two interaction matrices. The first interaction matrix,

,

represents the true structure of the underlying pattern of inter-firm task interdependence, and is
10

used to determine the performance landscape as discussed in the prior section. The second
interaction matrix,

, represents firms’ own representation of the inter-firm task

interdependencies, and can differ from the true matrix
derived from the true performance landscape

. The performance landscape for

is

to ensure that the (potentially misspecified)

performance values are correlated with the true performance values via the processes described
later in this section.
Firms search by evaluating alternatives and making choices with respect to their activities
based on a set of governance structures which we describe in a subsequent section. In the process
of evaluating alternatives and making changes to their activities

, the firms take into account

performance values as determined by the (misspecified) interdependence matrix,

. Once a

choice is made in any given period, however, the performance that firms actually experience is
defined by performance values stemming from the (true) interdependence matrix,

. While

searching for high performing configurations, firms compare the performance values of the
alternatives based on the
based on the

matrix with the observed performance of the current configuration

matrix.

Firms are said to have an under-specified view when the misspecified matrix
lower degree of interdependence than the true matrix
specified view when the misspecified matrix
true matrix

has a

; and firms are said to have an over-

has a higher degree of interdependence than the

. For the purpose of our analysis we will consider misspecifications that differ by

a single pattern difference as defined by the patterns in Figure 2. As an example, with a true
Pattern 3 interdependence matrix (i.e., where
defined as a situation where there is an
as a situation where there is an

is based on Pattern 3), under-specification is

based on Pattern 2, while over-specification is defined

based on Pattern 4.
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In the remainder of this section we discuss the processes for calculating the performance
values of the landscapes as a function of the under- or over-specification of the
performance levels for

pattern. The

(whether under- or over-specified) are derived from the

performance levels. To accomplish this we first define the performance landscape for

via the

process described in the previous section; and we then derive the performance landscapes for the
under- and over-specified cases using the procedures described next.
Under-specified interdependence matrix

. What is the procedure we use to construct

a performance landscape for an under-specified matrix? The performance values of the underspecified landscape should be correlated with the true landscape in such a way that the underspecified landscape appears to be a slightly “blurry” (or less rugged) version of the true
landscape. How do we accomplish this? When the matrix
is affected by ̅ other decisions, with ̅ <
associated with

in the true matrix

, where

is under-specified, each decision
is the number of interdependencies

. In order to calculate the performance landscape for

we take averages of the contribution values from the true interaction matrix
configuration of

for each fixed

and its ̅ interacting choices, an approach consistent with Gavetti and

Levinthal (2000).
We can illustrate this process with an example. Assume that in the true matrix
particular activity
misspecified matrix
activity

interacts with activities
the activity

and

contribution value function for activity
arguments of

, and

. Also assume that in the

is represented by managers as interacting only with

. The performance landscape

each unique combination of the

,

a

thus requires that we generate contribution values for
activities. For ease of notation, let
for the true matrix

refer to the

. Furthermore, let the four

( ) refer to the states (which can be either 0 or 1) of each of the activities
12

(

) refers to the contribution value assigned to the true (

through

. Thus

activity

where activities

through

contribution values for
configurations of the

are all set to 0. In our example, we would define the

in the misspecified matrix

and

) matrix for

for each of the four possible

activities as follows:

and

: Average { (

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

and

: Average { (

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

and

: Average { (

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

and

: Average { (

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

Over-specified interdependence matrix

. Having discussed the procedure for

constructing an under-specified performance landscape, we turn next to the procedure for
constructing the performance values of an over-specified landscape. In this case, rather than
being a slightly “blurry” (or less rugged) version of the true landscape (as it was in the underspecified case), the over-specified landscape can be thought of as a more “granular” (or more
rugged) version of the true landscape.
How do we accomplish this? When the matrix
affected by ̿ other activities, with ̿ >
associated with
and the

in the true matrix

(where

is

is the number of interdependencies

). This implies that for each unique combination of

other activities affecting it in the baseline

contribution values in the

is over-specified, each activity

matrix, there are

̿

additional

matrix that must be created to account for the additional

matrix

interdependencies. To generate these additional contribution values we follow the following
process. First, we generate
where

is

configuration of

(

̿

random numbers

), and
and the

from the uniform distribution

is the particular contribution value for

other policies affecting it (note that
13

,

for the specific

is based on the

function

that defines the landscape for the
two contribution values
to the additional

matrix). Second, for each random number
and

̿

we generate

. Finally, we randomly assign

and

activity combinations for which we need the additional contribution

values. Constructing the landscape for the over-specified matrix in this way allows us to ensure
that the true and misspecified landscapes are correlated with one another in the same way as they
are in the under-specified case. More specifically: under-specifying (by one pattern) an overspecified (by one pattern) landscape results in the original (correct) landscape.
We can illustrate the over-specification procedure with an example. Assume that in the
true matrix

the activity

interacts with

and

, while in the over-specified representation

, in addition to these interactions there are two additional interactions, with activities

and

. In this case it is necessary to define four additional contribution values for each possible
configuration of

,

and

. In the case where the activity configuration of (

(1,0,0), for example, we need to construct contribution values for activity

) is

where the

) values take on the following set of four possible configurations: (1,0,0,0,0),

(

(

(1,0,0,0,1), (1,0,0,1,0), and (1,0,0,1,1). To do this we start with
with

,

, which is the specific contribution value in the

configuration of (
error terms

and

matrix for the
(

) is (1,0,0). We define
from the uniform distribution

to generate the four contribution values

). That is, we start
activity where the

), and then generate two

. These two error terms then allow us
,

,

, and

, which we then assign at random to the four configurations noted above,
(1,0,0,0,0), (1,0,0,0,1), (1,0,0,1,0), and (1,0,0,1,1). E.g., if

(

function that maps the particular configuration of

to a particular contribution value

for

in the

through

) represents the

matrix, then after generating the contribution values through the process
14

described above, the random allocation could generate the following:
(

)

;

(

)

; and

(

)

(

)

;

.

Governance modes
We turn next to the governance modes that determine how agents in our model search the
performance landscape. We draw on Aggarwal et al. (2011), considering four governance modes
that represent varying points along the spectrum of alliance integration (Kogut and Singh, 1988;
Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Dyer et al., 2004; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). At the opposite
ends of the spectrum we have what we refer to as the modular and integrated modes of
governance. As hybrid forms we consider what we refer to as the self-governing alliance and
ratification modes. We describe each of these modes in detail in the remainder of this section.
In the modular mode of governance both firms make choices simultaneously within a
given period and only consider the profits associated with the particular activities within their
scope. We model a 12 activity system, with performance values normalized by the total value of
the system at the highest peak of the landscape (performance at the landscape peak is denoted by
). In the modular mode Firms 1 and 2 control their respective alliance and non-alliance
activities independently, with each firm thus controlling 6 of the 12 activities in the system. In
each period Firm 1 evaluates alternatives for activities
value of the configuration stemming from

based on the expected

, comparing these alternatives against the realized

performance from the prior period as determined by

, and selecting a choice if it increases

their expected performance. Firm 2 does the same for its own set of policy choices.
More precisely, in the modular mode, Firm 1 evaluates alternatives based on its expected
profit, ∑

( ̅)

, comparing this against the prior period realized performance,
15

∑

( ̅

∑

( ̅)

)

. Similarly, Firm 2 evaluates its alternatives based on its expected profit
( ̅

, comparing this against ∑

)

respectively represent the contribution values for activity

. In this notation
based on the

and

and
matrices

respectively. Vector ̅ refers to the configuration of the activities being evaluated in the current
period, while vector ̅

refers to the existing configuration of activities, as of the end of the

prior period. Firm 1 and Firm 2 can change up to two activities in any given period, and agents
for each firm evaluate all possible alternatives when making decisions in a given period. For
each agent, and for each alternative being considered by each agent, the vector

̅ , which

represents the vector being evaluated by the agent, is thus allowed to differ from the prior
round’s realized configuration ̅

by up to two activities. 4

While the modular mode can be conceptualized as a simple case of an arms-length
relationship where both firms work independently with full control of their activities, the
integrated mode lies at the other end of the spectrum. In the integrated mode Firms 1 and 2
operate as a single entity that makes decisions with respect to all 12 policy choices. Examples of
integrated governance structures can be found in long-term equity-based alliances where
decision making is fully integrated, and where firms behave as if they were a single entity (e.g.,
the alliance between Renault and Nissan, in which there is an integrated governance structure
under a single leadership).

4 Prior work has parameterized the number of activities that can be changed in any given period, as well as the
number of alternatives considered, referring to these values as “search radius” and “alternatives” (Siggelkow and
Rivkin [2005]; Aggarwal et al. [2011]). In our study we hold these parameters constant, allowing each agent to have
a search radius of 2, and to evaluate all possible alternatives associated with this search radius in any given period.
We thus map to what Aggarwal et al. (2011) refer to as “Capability Level D”. Our results and insights, however, are
qualitatively similar and robust to variation in these parameters. For ease of exposition we report all results based on
these fixed settings of “search radius” and “alternatives.” Results on alternative settings are available upon request.
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In our model of the integrated mode, the single agent takes into account the total
combined profit of Firms 1 and 2 when evaluating alternatives, comparing this against the profit
from the prior round’s full configuration. Formally, the quasi-integrated entity evaluates
( ̅)

alternatives based on ∑

, comparing these against ∑

( ̅

)

, where

̅ is the vector being evaluated, which differs from the prior round’s configuration ̅

by up to

two activities. Though profit is calculated at the level of the system, we can also report profit for
each firm; since the firms are symmetric in our analyses, profit for each individual firm is simply
½ of the the profit of the entire system.
In addition to the modular and integrated governance modes which lie on opposite ends
of the governance spectrum, we consider two hybrid modes: self-governing alliance and
ratification, in line with Aggarwal et al. (2011). In both cases the alliance function is managed
independently by a third agent (e.g., a joint committee formed by both firms to manage the
alliance). The agents for Firms 1 and 2 are responsible solely for their respective non-alliance
activities (

through

and

through

respectively), but in the process of evaluating

alternatives and making decisions each takes into account their individual total profit, which for
each firm is defined as the profit of the firm’s non-alliance activities plus a portion,
profit from the alliance activities (we set

, of the

throughout). The alliance agent considers

profit from only the alliance activities (i.e.,

through

) when evaluating alternatives and

making decisions.
More precisely, with the self-governing alliance and ratification modes, in each period
the Firm 1, Firm 2, and Alliance agents each make the following comparisons when evaluating
alternatives, with each agent able to make up to two changes to the (four) activities under each of
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their individual purview (i.e., in each case the N-dimensional vector of binary values ̅ differs
from ̅

by at most two activities):
Firm 1 compares:

∑

( ̅)

against: ∑
Firm 2 compares:

∑

Alliance compares:

∑

( ̅

)

( ̅)

against: ∑

( ̅)

∑
+

)

( ̅

)

( ̅

)

( ̅

)

( ̅)

∑
( ̅

∑

+

∑

( ̅)

against: ∑

Although the way the self-governing alliance and ratification modes compare alternatives
is the same, the two modes differ in the level of independence and degree of oversight over the
alliance agent. In the self-governing alliance mode, the alliance agent operates independently,
without any oversight from the firms. In any given period the alliance agent makes its decisions.
Firms 1 and 2 then select their policies simultaneously, taking into account the policy choice
made by the alliance agent.
In the ratification mode, by contrast, in any given period the Firm 1 and Firm 2 agents
decide on their activity set changes, followed by the alliance agent. Firm 1 and Firm 2 then have
veto power over the activity changes suggested by the alliance agent. That is, before
implementing any activity change, the alliance agent needs to have its proposed change ratified
by the agents of the two firms. Ratification requires that both firms accept the proposed policy
change, with a firm accepting any proposed policy change only if it does not reduce the firm’s
own profit.
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ANALYSIS
We model a 12-policy choice system of two firms, with four activity subsets

,

sub-divided as depicted in Figure 1, and with patterns of interdependence as depicted in Figure 2.
The model is symmetric for both firms such that the performance results of each are equal when
run over a large number of landscapes. We thus focus on analyzing the difference in overall
performance of the two-firm alliance system under varying combinations of interdependence
pattern and governance structure. We are interested in situations of over- or under-specification,
which we define as a single pattern higher or lower, respectively in interdependence (for
example, with the patterns in Figure 2, over-specification for Pattern 3 would be Pattern 4, while
under-specification for Pattern 3 would be Pattern 2). We assume that both firms and the alliance
agent (in the case of self-governing alliance and ratification) have the same misspecified view of
the underlying task structure. Each time period in the simulation consists of agents making a set
of decisions with respect to their activities (per the mode governing their decisions as described
in the previous section). We run the simulation for 200 periods on a particular landscape in order
to observe the long-run performance of firms in the system, and then take an average over 10,000
different simulation runs in order to minimize the effects of any statistical artifacts.

Performance implications of over- and under-specification
As a starting point for our analysis we compare long-term performance outcomes, i.e.
performance at the end of period 200, for the alliance system in the case of misspecification to
the case where all the agents in the system have a correct understanding of their task
interdependencies. We refer to the percentage decline in overall performance as the “value-loss”
due to the misspecification of task interdependence.
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Over-specified case. We begin with the situation where the firm agents (and alliance
agent in the case of the self-governing alliance and ratification modes) have an over-specified
view of the underlying task structure. We consider performance for the four different forms of
governance under the various interdependence patterns. Table 1A compares the performance
outcomes of the four governance modes under Patterns 1 through 4 for firms with the overspecified view. We find that the average long-run performance for firms with an over-specified
view decreases for all patterns. Pattern 1 has a lower value loss compared to the rest of patterns,
due primarily to the difference in the additional number of interdependencies agents consider in
5

the search landscape. Moving on to the rest of the patterns, we find that the overall value loss
decreases as we move from Pattern 2 to Pattern 4. For example, for the modular governance
mode, the overall value loss is -18.6% for Pattern 2 as compared to -14.8% for Pattern 4.
Similarly, for the self-governing alliance mode the overall value loss is -15.0% for Pattern 2
whereas it is -4.6% for Pattern 4. Further, for the ratification mode the overall value loss is 18.8% for Pattern 2, while it is -8.3% for Pattern 4. For the integrated mode the overall value
loss is -20.0% for Pattern 2 and -11.3% for Pattern 4.
Our findings on the effects of over-specification are consistent with intuition. The overall
loss in value for the firm with an over-specified view is directly linked to the error introduced
into the search process as a consequence of the over-specification. For example, in the case of
Pattern 1, while searching for higher performance the firm assumes that the alliance activities of
the two firms are interdependent, impacting its performance. In reality, however, the underlying
task is fully decomposable, with no interdependence between the alliance activities of the two

5

Pattern 1 differs from other patterns with respect to the total number of interdependencies that the agents consider
in their search landscape (an additional 8 interdependencies with an over-specified view). For the other patterns the
search landscape has an additional 32 interdependencies.
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firms. This misspecification of interdependence leads to an error in the search process,
decreasing performance.
Under-specified case. We turn next to examining how under-specification affects the
performance of both firms. Table 1B shows performance outcomes of the various modes under
Patterns 2 through 5 for firms with the under-specified view. We find that under-specification
leads to lower performance on average. Similar to the over-specification results we find that
Pattern 2 has a lower value loss compared to the other patterns with under-specification,
primarily due to the difference in the characteristics of interdependencies that agents consider to
be missing in the case of Pattern 2 and the other patterns.

6

In the under-specified case we also find that the overall value loss decreases as we move
from Pattern 3 to Pattern 5. In fact, for Pattern 5, we find that the overall performance increases
for the modular and self-governing alliance modes. For example, in the case of the modular
governance mode, the overall value loss is -19.1% for Pattern 3 as compared to a 7.8% gain for
Pattern 5. Similarly, the overall value loss for Pattern 3 in the case of the self-governing alliance
is -17.3%, while it is -1.0% for Pattern 5. For other modes the overall value losses for Pattern 2
with the ratification and integrated modes are -15.6% and -21.6% respectively, while they are 2.5% and -9.5% for Pattern 5 with the ratification and integrated modes.
We can then observe the governance structure that provides the highest performance level
when agents have the correct view as compared to when they have a misspecified view.
Interestingly, we find that misspecification of task structure often results in a different
governance mode providing the optimal level performance. For example, the integrated

6

Firms consider a total of 8 interdependencies within the alliance agent to be missing when considering the underspecified view of Pattern 2. For the rest of the patterns, firms consider their search landscape to have 32 fewer
interdependencies as compared to that of the true landscape.
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governance mode provides the highest performance for Pattern 4 when firms have the correct
view, while the self-governing alliance mode provides the highest performance with both underand over- specified views. On average, we find that the self-governing alliance mode provides
the highest performance across patterns for both forms of misspecification (Pattern 1 with the
over-specified view is an exception where the modular governance mode performs better). We
turn to the mechanisms driving these results in the next section.
[INSERT TABLES 1A AND 1B HERE]
Coordination failures and exploration as intermediate explanatory mechanisms
To more deeply understand the reasons for the differences in value loss among the various
interdependence pattern-governance mode combinations, we turn next to the mechanisms that
may influence firm performance in an alliance setting, building on Aggarwal et al.’s (2011)
discussion of the role of coordination and exploration in influencing the performance effects of
alliance governance. Figure 3 illustrates the over-arching conceptual framework we explore in
the remainder of this section: coordination failures and exploration achieved are intermediate
measures that link misspecification, governance mode and level of interdependence with firm
performance in an alliance setting.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
Why do we focus in particular on the dimensions of coordination and exploration?
Coordination concerns are pervasive in an alliance context (Litwalk and Hylton, 1962),
influencing governance mode decisions (Gulati and Singh, 1998). The ability to effectively
coordinate activities among alliance partners, moreover, influences alliance performance (Zollo,
Reuer and Singh, 2002; Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 2005). In addition to effective
coordination, exploration is a key determinant of alliance performance as well (Child, 2001;
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Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). We thus aim to understand how
interdependence misspecifications, together with governance modes and actual patterns of
interdependence, link to firm performance via the mediating effects of coordination and
exploration.
Constructing the intermediate measures of coordination and exploration. We construct
the measure, coordination failures, which we define, in any given period, to be the total number
of incidences up to and including the current period in which firms (in total) experience a profit
decline as compared to the previous period due to simultaneous decision making by the two
firms. Total (Firm 1 + Firm 2) profit can decline both because of simultaneous movement of the
agents, as well as because of errors in the search process due to landscape misspecification. We
isolate the former by stripping out situations of search-related error.7 For our analyses in this
paper we consider coordination failures at period 200, which is the point at which the two-firm
system has reached a steady-state level of performance.
We also construct the measure exploration achieved by calculating the total number of
unique contribution values ( ’s) evaluated by the agents in the system over time, normalized by
the total number of possible contribution values that exist for the given landscape (Aggarwal et
al., 2011).8 The evaluated and total contribution values used as inputs to our exploration
achieved measure come from the true landscape (
history on the misspecified landscape (

), and are based on the agents’ search

). More precisely, for each policy configuration

7 Due to differences in the contribution values between the search ( ) and true ( ) landscapes, configurations
leading to high performance on the search landscape may not lead to high performance on the true landscape. An
agent using a misspecified landscape for search may commit to a policy configuration that can lead to a decline in
performance on the true landscape. We refer to this decline in performance due to differences in contribution values
between the true and search landscapes as “search-related error.” We strip out such search-related errors from the
measure of coordination failures so that the measure reflects only situations where agents simultaneously make a
choice that may be correct for each firm individually, but that ends up being performance reducing for the total
profits of both firms as a whole.
8 For instance, the total number of possible contribution values for Pattern 1 is 144, and for Pattern 5 it is 49,152.
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evaluated by the agents on the search landscape (

) up to and including the focal period, we

take the corresponding configuration on the true landscape (

) and identify whether the

contribution values for that policy configuration, as derived from the

landscape, have been

considered by the agents in the search process up to and including the focal period. 9 We count
the total number of such cases where a particular contribution value has been evaluated, and
divide this by the total number of distinct contribution values based on

.

As we do with

coordination failures, we consider exploration achieved in the steady-state at period 200.
Implications of over-specification for intermediate measures. How does overspecification affect the intermediate measures of coordination failures and exploration? In the
over-specified case the landscape searched by the agents becomes more rugged than that of the
true landscape. Additionally, values of adjacent locations on the landscape are less correlated as
compared to that of the true landscape. This increases the number of alternatives the agent
considers, as well as the duration of the search process before an agent locks itself into a policy
configuration. While this increase in the number of alternatives considered leads to a higher
degree of exploration achieved, the increase in search time also leads to higher levels of
coordination failure. With multiple agents searching the landscape at the same time, the chances
of coordination failure increases as policies selected by one agent may not be optimal for the
other. The degree of coordination failures between agents thus depends on the duration over
which agents search the landscape simultaneously.

9 Note that any given policy configuration will exist on both landscapes (M and M ). However, whether or not the
0
1

corresponding contribution values are “distinct” is a function of the interdependence structure of that landscape
(which of course differs between M0 and M1). As an example, suppose we take a simple system in where there are
only two possible binary policy choices {d 1, d2}. When an agent evaluates the move from the existing policy
configuration {0,0} to a new policy configuration {0,1}, the number of distinct contribution values she considers
will differ depending on whether the two policy choices are interdependent or not. If they are interdependent, then
there would be two unique contribution values, C1(0,1) and C2(0,1), which would be taken into account; if they are
not interdependent, then only one unique contribution value, C2(0,1) would need to be considered.
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We report the results of the effect of over-specification on exploration achieved and
coordination failures in the middle two columns of Table 2A (falling under the heading
“symmetric view”). As in Table 1 we compare the performance metric (in this case exploration
achieved or coordination failures) for the misspecified case relative to the correctly-specified
case at the end of period 200. The table shows that the overall degree of exploration achieved by
the agents increases with the over-specified view. Furthermore, the effect of over-specification is
more prominent at patterns with a higher degree of interdependence, and with the modular and
self-governing alliance modes. In addition, agents with the over-specified view face a higher
level of coordination failure. For example, under Patterns 3 and 4 with the self-governing
alliance mode, coordination failures increase by 3.5% and 1.6% respectively.
Implications of under-specification for intermediate measures. How does underspecification affect the intermediate measures of coordination failures and exploration? In the
under-specified case the search space for the agent is simplified. The agent searches on a
landscape with a lower degree of interdependence that is consequently less rugged as compared
to the true landscape. Each policy on the search landscape corresponds to a cluster of policies on
the actual landscape. This simplification of the search landscape speeds the agent’s search
processes (e.g., Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000), enabling the agent to relatively quickly identify a
peak with respect to its search landscape. Thus, the degree of exploration achieved with the
underspecified-view decreases, as Table 2B (middle two columns, under the heading “symmetric
view”) reports. The increase in search speed is particularly helpful in reducing coordination
failures: with an increase in search speed agents identify optimal performance configurations
with relatively fewer activity changes, reducing the overall number of associated coordination
failures.
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[INSERT TABLES 2A AND 2B HERE]
Concordance with conceptual framework. Having discussed the implications of
misspecification for coordination and exploration, we now return to Figure 3, with the aim of
testing the conceptual framework depicted there. To do so we construct a dataset based on our
simulation results at period 200 with 320,000 observations: we run 10,000 trials for each
combination of misspecification-pattern-governance mode combination; and we then employ
seemingly unrelated regression (SUREG) to analyze the results, using the framework depicted in
Figure 3. We estimate three equations simultaneously: (1) the impact of misspecification on
exploration achieved; (2) the impact of misspecification on coordination failures; and (3) the
impact of exploration achieved and coordination failures on total performance. Seemingly
unrelated regression (SUREG) allows for correlation between the error terms of these equations
(Zellner, 1962, 1963), a likely situation given the approach used to construct our dataset.
In our SUREG models the variable, misspecification, takes the value of one when the
observation is under a misspecified view, and 0 otherwise. We estimate models for over- and
under- specification separately. To control for the effects of patterns and governance modes we
include dummy variables for these factors. The modular governance mode is used as the base
mode against which to compare the effects of the other modes; and Pattern 2 is used as the base
pattern against which to compare the effects of the other patterns.

10

Estimated standardized coefficients for the two models (over- and under-specified) are
reported in Table 3. We do not show p-values of the estimated coefficients to avoid redundancy,
as all the p-values are less than 0.001 (with the exception of the effect of misspecification on

10

Since we do not have any observations for Pattern 1 in the case of the under-specified view, and for Pattern 5 in
the case of the over-specified view, we use Pattern 2 as the base pattern, as it is common across both forms of
misspecification.
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coordination failures in the case of the over-specified view). As Model 1 shows, the coefficient
of misspecification on exploration is positive, suggesting that over-specification of task structure
is associated with higher exploration. On average, firms with the over-specified view tend to
explore more by 0.10 standard deviation. Similarly, in Model 2, the coefficient of
misspecification on coordination failures is negative, suggesting that under-specification is
associated with fewer coordination failures. Though we do not find statistically significant
effects of over-specification on coordination failures, we do find that under-specification
increases coordination failures by 0.19 standard deviations. Furthermore, consistent with earlier
research we find that the coefficient of exploration on overall performance is positive, and the
coefficient of coordination failures on overall performance is negative, for both Model 1 and
Model 2. We find that a standard deviation increase in coordination failures decreases overall
performance by -0.21 and -0.37 standard deviations for over- and under-specification
respectively. Similarly we find that a standard deviation increase in exploration increases overall
performance by 0.38 and 0.45 standard deviations for over- and under-specification respectively.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Implications for governance mode choice: asymmetric view
In a final set of analyses we consider the situation in which only one partner has either an underor over-specified view. The results of the “asymmetric” perspective on coordination and
exploration outcomes are shown in the right two columns of Tables 2A and 2B (under the
heading “asymmetric view”). The asymmetric view is one in which the focal firm has the correct
representation, while the partner has the misspecified view. These results help address the
question of what governance mode managers should choose (or rather, negotiate for ex ante),
conditional on their assessment of their partners’ likely representation of interdependencies.
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As Table 2A suggests, if managers believe their partner to be over-specified, higher
levels of exploration can be obtained by selecting the modular governance mode, and
coordination failures can be minimized by selecting the self-governing alliance mode. If on the
other hand managers believe their partner to be under-specified, as Table 2B illustrates, they can
minimize exploration losses by using the modular mode when in a lower interdependence
situation (Patterns 2 and 3) and by using the ratification mode when in a higher interdependence
situation (Patterns 4 and 5). Governance choice thus depends on managers’ understanding of
their task structure, their partner’s level of misspecification, and the ultimate objectives of the
alliance (whether this is firm performance itself, achieving high levels of exploration, or
avoiding coordination failures).

DISCUSSION
Our aim in this paper was to use a computational model to understand the implications of
incorrect managerial representations of inter-firm task interdependencies in the context of
alliance relationships, focusing on the effects of under- and over-specification under varying
combinations of true inter-firm task interdependence and modes of alliance governance. We
derive three sets of results.
First, we find that managerial misspecification of interdependence structures leads to a
decline in firm performance, a result consistent with prior case-based work (Doz [1996]; Sosa et
al. [2007]). Our results suggest a number of interesting nuances. We find that while over- and
under-specification of interdependence have similar effects on performance, the degree of value
loss due to misspecification varies by governance mode. The decline in performance is on
average lower for the modular and self-governing alliance modes. This difference in the effect of
misspecification on various governance modes has important implications. When both firms
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have a correct understanding of their interdependencies, the integrated mode provides better
performance at patterns with higher interdependence (Patterns 4 and 5). As we relax the
assumption of a correct understanding, however, we find that the self-governing alliance mode
provides better performance than the integrated mode. The degree to which firms have an
understanding of their underlying interdependencies is thus important in deciding on the optimal
mode of governance.
A second set of results is that the pattern of interdependence has a crucial impact on the
level of decline in alliance performance due to misspecification. Interestingly, the decline in
performance decreases with an increase in the degree of interdependence in the underlying task
structure. As illustrated in Tables 1A and 1B, the value loss for the alliance is lowest with
Patterns 4 and 5 for both forms of misspecification. We are able to explain these results using the
intermediate measures of coordination and exploration.
Our analysis of these intermediate measures leads to our final set of conclusions, which
relates to the possibly competing objectives relating to coordination and exploration. Our study
lends insight into the consequences of misspecification for these two objectives, as we find that
the two forms of misspecification affect each differently. The overall level of exploration
achieved by the alliance increases with an over-specified view; in the case of an under-specified
view, however, the overall exploration level decreases (though with a few exceptions for low
complexity patterns). Similarly, we find that coordination failures increase when both firms share
an over-specified view. Although in the case of the under-specified view coordination failures
are limited, they decline at higher levels of interdependence. This presents an interesting tradeoff between paying attention to firm performance versus other alliance objectives such as
exploration. Firms with an over-specified view of interdependence may achieve higher
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exploration, yet trade this off with lower performance. Likewise, with higher levels of
interdependence firms can take on an under-specified view in order to achieve fewer
coordination failures.
From a managerial perspective our results underscore the importance of paying attention
to task interdependencies when structuring alliances. Decision makers should, in particular,
make attempts to identify the true structure of their inter-firm interdependence. While estimating
ex ante the magnitude and direction of misspecification may be difficult, managers may be able
to reduce the magnitude of such errors by investing in efforts to identify the true interdependence
structures in alliances: e.g., pre-alliance discussions and alliance management capabilities can
help reduce the likelihood of any misspecifications. Such investments in understanding the true
structure become particularly important because, as our results suggest, firms’ task structure
representations are significant inputs to the choice of alliance governance mode.
Before concluding we discuss some of the assumptions embedded in our model, and their
implications for our results. First, our model assumes that both firms are symmetric with respect
to their views on interdependence. However, it may not be uncommon to have an alliance where
both partners have different views of their interdependencies. We conducted robustness checks
to understand the implications of this assumption. As noted in our discussion of coordination and
exploration, we evaluated an ‘asymmetric view’ scenario in which only one of the partner firms
has an incorrect view of their interdependence. The overall performance implications were
consistent with our main findings, with the magnitude of value loss decreasing when only one
partner has an incorrect understanding.
As a second assumption embedded in our analysis, note that we pre-specify firms’
understanding regarding their interdependence structure, and assume that this remains constant
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for the entire period (i.e., there is no learning by agents about the true nature of their
interdependence). It is likely, however, that firms update their understanding based on feedback
received over the course of the alliance. While our purpose in the present paper was solely to
examine the implications of relaxing the assumption of a correct specification of inter-firm task
interdependencies (a gap that the literature has not yet addressed), it would be a natural extension
to relax this assumption and to extend our model in order to study how the process of learning
about interdependencies over time (and possibly modifying the alliance governance structure
accordingly) influences our results.
As a final assumption, note that we use a pre-defined set of patterns of interdependence to
represent task structures and firms’ understanding of these structures. The current patterns
represent discrete points on the continuum of increasing task complexity. These patterns
characterize ideal configuration types that are useful for exposition; hybrid patterns may arise in
reality, however, and future research might thus examine such patterns. We did run our results
using a “random K” scenario to evaluate the implications of increasing levels of
interdependence, where these interdependencies were randomly scattered throughout the task
matrix. The results on this analysis were broadly consistent with our findings.
Our paper leads to a number of implications for work in the area of alliance governance.
While the issue of governance structure choice has been examined both implicitly and explicitly
in the alliance literature, with significant progress being made using empirical indicators, ours is
the first effort to attempt to understand the implications of relaxing the common assumption that
managers operate with a “true” representation of inter-firm interdependencies. Because in
practice managers are unlikely to have perfect ex ante representations of their interdependencies,
as we discuss up-front with the example from Doz (1996), such an assumption is likely to be
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unrealistic. Using empirical methods alone, however, is unlikely to allow to us fully address the
implications of interdependence misspecifications, as empirical data is unlikely to be structured
so as to allow simultaneous and deep observation of managerial representations,
interdependencies, and governance structures. As a consequence, computational modeling
provides an effective tool with which to examine the implications of managerial errors in
interdependence representations in a structured way. The insights we gain from our model can
complement future empirical work, and more importantly serve to inform the core theorizing that
can guide these future empirical examinations of this topic.
In conclusion, we make an important set of contributions to the literature on alliance
governance by highlighting how a partial understanding of task interdependencies can be
detrimental for alliance performance. We go beyond prior work to explicitly study the effect of
errors on various patterns of interdependence, a task that would be difficult to accomplish using
empirical methods alone. In so doing we contribute to the literature on governance choice (e.g.
Dyer et al., 2004; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005), shedding new insights into the link between
interdependence, governance modes, and firm performance in alliance settings, and offering a
promising set of avenues for future research.
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Figure 1. Interaction matrix example
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Note: This example corresponds to “Pattern 1” as described in Figure 2
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Figure 2. Patterns of interdependence
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Figure 3: Framework for understanding the effect of misspecification
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Table 1A. Value loss, over-specified representation
Underlying
Governance
Performance with
pattern
mode
correct view
Pattern 1
Modular
0.991
Self-Governing
0.993
Ratification
0.993
Integrated
0.989
Pattern 2
Modular
0.948
Self-Governing
0.989
Ratification
0.989
Integrated
0.986
Pattern 3
Modular
0.950
Self-Governing
0.932
Ratification
0.908
Integrated
0.949
Pattern 4
Modular
0.884
Self-Governing
0.884
Ratification
0.879
Integrated
0.922

Performance with
over-specified view
0.949
0.927
0.912
0.926
0.771
0.842
0.802
0.785
0.783
0.793
0.765
0.763
0.747
0.845
0.803
0.816

% value loss

Table 1B. Value loss, under-specified representation
Underlying
Governance
Performance with
pattern
mode
correct view
Pattern 2
Modular
0.944
Self-Governing
0.990
Ratification
0.990
Integrated
0.985
Pattern 3
Modular
0.950
Self-Governing
0.931
Ratification
0.902
Integrated
0.949
Pattern 4
Modular
0.873
Self-Governing
0.884
Ratification
0.877
Integrated
0.927
Pattern 5
Modular
0.747
Self-Governing
0.828
Ratification
0.780
Integrated
0.910

Performance with
over-specified view
0.921
0.928
0.918
0.919
0.773
0.773
0.770
0.751
0.745
0.795
0.755
0.749
0.808
0.829
0.757
0.823

% value loss

-4.1%
-6.8%
-8.0%
-6.4%
-18.6%
-15.0%
-18.8%
-20.0%
-17.0%
-14.9%
-15.2%
-19.5%
-14.8%
-4.6%
-8.3%
-11.3%

-2.6%
-6.2%
-7.2%
-6.6%
-19.1%
-17.3%
-15.6%
-21.6%
-15.6%
-10.3%
-14.7%
-19.0%
7.8%
-1.0%
-2.5%
-9.5%

Note: Values in bold indicate the governance mode providing superior performance for each combination of pattern
and managerial representation (either correct or misspecified). For example, in Table 1A, with the combination of
[Pattern 1, Correct View], both the self-governing and ratification modes provide the highest performance.
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Table 2A: Changes in coordination and exploration, over-specified representation
Symmetric view
Asymmetric view
Underlying Governance
pattern
mode
Exploration Coordination
Exploration Coordination
Pattern 1
Modular
0.9%
0.0%
0.7%
0.0%
Self-Governing
3.4%
0.0%
-0.9%
0.0%
Ratification
2.3%
0.0%
-0.6%
0.0%
Integrated
1.6%
0.0%
Pattern 2
Modular
0.6%
-14.3%
1.6%
-5.6%
Self-Governing
5.3%
0.0%
0.3%
0.0%
Ratification
0.5%
0.0%
0.3%
0.0%
Integrated
1.8%
0.0%
Pattern 3
Modular
7.7%
0.1%
2.6%
2.4%
Self-Governing
9.4%
3.5%
0.9%
1.0%
Ratification
0.2%
6.2%
-0.3%
5.9%
Integrated
3.7%
0.0%
Pattern 4
Modular
3.4%
-0.5%
0.7%
2.5%
Self-Governing
0.5%
1.6%
0.4%
0.9%
Ratification
0.3%
3.9%
0.0%
4.1%
Integrated
1.6%
0.0%
Table 2B: Changes in coordination and exploration, under-specified representation
Symmetric view
Asymmetric view
Underlying Governance
pattern
mode
Exploration
Coordination
Exploration Coordination
Pattern 2
Modular
-1.4%
-11.7%
-0.5%
-10.0%
Self-Governing
0.6%
0.0%
-1.6%
0.0%
Ratification
0.1%
0.0%
-1.4%
0.0%
Integrated
-1.2%
0.0%
Pattern 3
Modular
2.3%
1.1%
0.1%
1.0%
Self-Governing
-1.8%
3.4%
-0.8%
0.5%
Ratification
1.3%
5.1%
0.1%
3.6%
Integrated
3.0%
0.0%
Pattern 4
Modular
-2.1%
-11.0%
-1.8%
-8.7%
Self-Governing
-0.6%
2.4%
-0.5%
0.1%
Ratification
0.0%
4.6%
-0.1%
0.9%
Integrated
1.1%
0.0%
Pattern 5
Modular
-2.6%
-24.3%
-1.7%
-17.6%
Self-Governing
-1.3%
-1.1%
-0.9%
-1.8%
Ratification
-0.6%
-13.9%
-0.4%
-12.1%
Integrated
0.0%
0.0%
-
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Table 3: Effect of misspecification on exploration, coordination failure and total profits
Dependent
Independent variable
Model 1
Model 2
variable
(all dummy variables
(Over(Underexcept for constant)
specification)
specification)
Exploration
Misspecification
0.098
-0.009
Self-governing
-0.147
-0.221
Ratification
-0.234
-0.250
Integrated
1.055
0.787
Pattern 1
0.293
Pattern 3
-1.053
-1.328
Pattern 4
-1.629
-1.958
Pattern 5
-1.988
Constant
0.379
1.244
2
R
0.874
0.818
Coord. failures

Performance

Misspecification
Self-governing
Ratification
Integrated
Pattern 1
Pattern 3
Pattern 4
Pattern 5
Constant
R2
Exploration
Coordination failures
Misspecification
Self-governing
Ratification
Integrated
Constant
R2
Observations

0.003
-0.694
-0.600
-0.768
-0.278
-0.077
0.282
0.532
0.132
0.383
-0.212
-1.116
0.116
-0.005
-0.423
0.636
0.413
320,000

-0.193
-0.801
-0.561
-0.916
-0.081
0.117
0.478
0.537
0.179
0.459
-0.375
-0.830
0.012
-0.127
-0.445
0.555
0.390
320,000

Note: All independent variables are dummy variables, except for exploration, coordination failures, and the
constant. The misspecification dummy variable refers to the over-specified view for Model 1 and to the underspecified view for Model 2.
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